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1. Introduction 
Social capital is one of the most popular and controversial topics in the contemporary debate. 
Following Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti’s seminal work, most studies define the concept as the 
features of social life – networks, norms, and trust – that enable participants to act together more 
effectively to pursue shared objectives (1993). Although such definition is widely accepted in the 
literature, it implies a range of relevant problems both for theoretical and empirical research. 
Networks, norms, and trust do not necessarily act in the same way, and the nature of their 
relationships needs to be carefully assessed every time. First, some kinds of networks can hamper 
the diffusion of trust and cooperative values, thereby exerting a negative influence on well-being 
and development. Second, considering trust as social capital leads to treat the concept as good and 
desirable by definition, without taking into the proper account its complexity. Trust is in fact an 
indispensable asset for the economic activity, due to its ability to promote cooperation and to 
improve the efficiency of markets (Arrow, 1974, Dasgupta, 2000). In the long run, trust has been 
acknowledged as a factor causing economic growth by the empirical literature (Knack and Keefer, 
1999, Zak and Knack, 2001, Dincer and Uslaner, 2007). Hence, if we define (and measure) social 
capital as trust, any empirical testing will tautologically find that social capital plays a positive role 
for the economic activity. Moreover, trust must be considered as a multidimensional concept just 
like social capital. Besides the “social” trust referred to by growth studies, the literature has in fact 
identified other facets of the concept, each one being connected to certain interpersonal 
relationships.  
Also due to such conceptual ambiguities, both in the social psychology and the economics literature 
there is a surprising lack of studies addressing the role of social capital’s various sub-dimensions (as 
given by different types of networks) in the accumulation of social trust, with the few exceptions 
providing partial evidence and sometimes conflicting results.  
In this paper, we take trust and social capital separately, providing a definition of social capital as 
networks of relationships cemented by repeated interactions and shared values, and suggesting that 
the economic effects of such networks should be assessed in relation to their role in the 
“socialization” of trust. The complexity of the two concepts is accounted for through the definition 
of four types of social capital – as shaped by bonding, bridging, linking, and corporate networks – 
and the consideration of different levels of trust – i.e. social trust, knowledge-based trust, trust 
towards the institutions and trust in public services. 
Our empirical analysis carries out an assessment of the relationships connecting trust’s and social 
capital’s sub-dimensions. More in particular, we aim to shed light on which type of social capital 
may enhance the diffusion of “development-oriented” trust. To this purpose, we have collected   3
micro data on trust and social capital on the field through the submission of a questionnaire to a 
community of small entrepreneurs and other stakeholders of the Italian industrial district of the 
Tuscia, located about 60 miles north of Rome.  
This case study is of general interest for at least two reasons. First, industrial districts (IDs) are a 
central feature of the Italian model of development, largely based on the driving force of small and 
medium enterprises. Starting from Marshall (1886), the related literature has emphasised concepts 
such as the “industrial atmosphere”, and the long-term socio-economic relationships among local 
firms, involving trust and a blend of competition and collaboration, to explain the superior 
economic performance of regions such as the Third Italy, or Silicon Valley in the US (Becattini, 
2004, Becattini and Dardi, 2006, Bellandi, 2006). IDs can thus be seen as incubators for the 
development of those trust-intensive relations which stimulate transactions and growth. Second, this 
model of development is currently facing a major challenge, since globalization’s processes are 
posing a threat just to the socio-economic ties that function as the glue holding together IDs 
(Bertolini and Giovannetti, 2006, Amighini and Rabellotti, 2005, Mariotti et al, 2008). 
The econometric strategy is articulated in two stages. First a series of probit analyses is run to 
explore the effects of different types of networks on “social” or “generalized” trust. Then, the 
relationships between the forms of social capital and the different types of trust are assessed by 
means of structural equations models (SEMs). 
Our results suggest that, in the Tuscia district, the main factors fostering the diffusion of social trust 
are the perception that the local community is a safe place, and the establishment of corporate ties 
through professional associations. Trust in people is positively and significantly correlated also to 
higher levels of satisfaction and confidence in public services. Participation in voluntary 
organizations does not appear to increase trust in people. Rather, we find evidence of the other way 
round: interpersonal trust seems to encourage civic engagement. The correlation between 
participation and social trust may be created in a self-selection process where people who are 
already high social trusters are more likely to join and become active in organizations and networks.  
The contribution of this paper to the literature is threefold. First, we provide an assessment of the 
role exerted by different types of networks in the accumulation of trust, which is the catalyst 
sparking off the positive action of social capital on the economy and well-being. Second, we 
contribute to shedding light on some conceptual ambiguities that have plagued the previous 
literature. More in particular, the analysis acknowledges the multidimensionality of social capital, 
addressing the so far quite neglected role of family and corporate ties. Our findings also provide 
some hints for better understanding the “direction” of the causal nexus connecting trust and civic   4
participation. Third, we enrich the “traditional” tripartition of the forms of social capital by 
introducing a new category shaped by corporate ties. 
The outline of the paper is as follows: the next two sections introduce the concepts of trust and 
social capital through a review of the literature. Section four presents some hypotheses on the 
determinants of trust. Sections five and six present the results of the probit and the SEM analyses. 
The survey is closed by a discussion of such results and some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Trust and the economic activity 
Although the huge amount of research on trust, a concise and universally accepted definition of the 
concept remains elusive. As a consequence, the term trust is used in a variety of distinct, and not 
always compatible, ways (Kramer, 1999). 
Influential definitions consider trust as a general attitude or expectancy about other people and the 
social system in which they are embedded (Garfinkel, 1963, Luhmann, 1988, Hardin, 2001). In 
other words, trust is people’s belief in others’ good intentions, that is, others’ intentions not to harm 
them, to respect their rights, and to carry out obligations (Igarashi et al, 2008). According to Schul 
et al (2008), “A state of trust is associated with a feeling of safety. The environment is as it 
normally is and things really are as they appear to be. Thus, individuals see no reason to refrain 
from doing what they routinely do. Ordinarily, when the stakes are not high, trust is the default 
state, so that without thinking much about the other, individuals feel the environment is normal and 
there is no need to worry” (2008, 1293). Distrust, in contrast, is associated with the concealment of 
truth and a lack of transparency. It is a state of uncertainty, but not the kind associated with 
outcomes that are inherently probabilistic, as in playing a slot machine or roulette. Rather, distrust 
reflects the receiver’s perception of the source’s intention (to mislead) and, potentially, the 
receiver’s theory about the truth (Schul et al, 2007). 
Given such definitions, it is easy to state that the diffusion of trust is an indispensable lubricant for 
the economic activity: if individuals feel safe and act routinely, their behavior is more easily 
foreseeable, thereby causing a reduction in monitoring costs which stimulates transactions. In the 
words of Arrow: “Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, 
certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly argued that much of 
the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence” (1972, 
357). Most studies show that enterprises devote an ever more share of their financial resources to 
activities which are not directly related to their production processes. Nurturing a cooperative 
climate inside the workforce and building trustworthy relationships both inside the firm and with 
external partners generally constitute a key task for management. If human interactions within the   5
workforce are trustworthy and relaxed, employees are more inclined to do their best at work, and 
are more likely to sanction shirking behaviours through peer monitoring. Salamon and Robinson 
(2008) show that, when employees in an organization perceive they are trusted by management, 
increases in the presence of responsibility norms, as well as in the sales performance and customer 
service performance of the organization, are observed in a sample of 88 retail stores in Canada. In a 
study on the Italian regions, Sabatini (2008a) finds that operating in a social environment rich of 
bridging and linking ties significantly raises labour productivity in small and medium enterprises. 
The results from a study of 545 managers in China carried out by Zhang et al (2008) show that 
trustworthy and supportive relationships between employees and managers nurture workers’ trust in 
the organization, with beneficial effects in terms of effort and productivity. 
 
3. Trust: definition and measurement 
While the importance of trust is commonly accepted by the literature, the definition of which kind 
of trust works as a lubricant for the economic activity is still open to question. In one of the most 
influential economic studies on trust, Knack and Keefer (1997) state that “Trust-sensitive 
transactions include those in which goods and services are provided in exchange for future 
payment, employment contracts in which managers rely on employees to accomplish tasks that are 
difficult to monitor, and investments and savings decisions that rely on assurances by governments 
or banks that they will not expropriate these assets” (1997, 1252). Even if the authors do not draw 
any classification of the concept, it possible to argue that their notion of trust involves people who 
never met before or, in a simple word, strangers. Trust towards strangers is often referred to as 
“generalized trust”. Uslaner (2002) prefers to call it “moralistic trust”, in that it noes depend upon 
information and experience. Instead, “It is a commandment to treat people as if they were 
trustworthy … Moralistic trust is the belief that others share your fundamental moral values and 
therefore should be treated as you would wish to be treated by them … Moralistic trust is not a 
prediction of how others will behave. Even if other people turn out not to be trustworthy, moral 
values require you to behave as if they could be trusted” (Uslaner, 2002, 19). The “moral” roots of 
trust are acknowledged also in the social psychology literature: according toYamagishi (1998), 
generalized trust is a general belief in human benevolence: that is, it suggests that trustworthiness is 
an aspect of human nature. 
Still, theoretical studies in economics generally account for a kind of trust which is based on 
information and experience. According to Dasgupta (2000), we trust people only when we know 
something about their disposition, their available options, their ability and so forth, so we think they   6
are trustworthy and expect they will choose to behave themselves. Burt and Knez (1996) define 
trust as anticipated cooperation, arguing that the issue is not moral. 
This notion of trust is referred to by Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) with the term “knowledge-
based” trust, which is obviously of crucial importance for the economic activity. Still, this is not the 
kind of trust that can benefit the economy “as a whole”, for the simple reason that it is based on the 
knowledge we accumulate through  experience: in large societies, it is impossible to interact with 
every people, so the inference on their behaviour cannot be based on knowledge or experience. 
According to Uslaner (2001), “The difference between generalized and particularized trust is 
similar to the distinction Putnam (1993, 93) drew between “bonding” and “bridging” social capital. 
We bond with our friends and people like ourselves. We form bridges with people who are different 
from ourselves. While Putnam argued that both can lead to trust, he held that bridging organizations 
would produce much more trust”.  
The aim of our empirical analysis is just to shed light on the relationship between the different 
dimensions of social capital (i.e. the bonding and the bridging cited above, plus two more types 
shaped by linking and corporate ties) and the various forms of trust. More in particular, we will test 
whether, and on which bases, social participation could lead us to trust unknown people as if we 
had previously encountered them.  
Our basic idea is that, in some cases, being part of a network can make us feel more confident both 
in the good faith of “others” and in our ability not to be injured by the others’ possible free-riding 
behaviours. In other terms, a network member may feel stronger and not defenceless towards the 
uncertainty related to social interactions. 
 
3.1 Generalized or social trust 
Generalized trust has been measured through the famous question developed by Rosenberg (1956): 
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can be too careful 
in dealing with people?”. Possible responses to this question are: “Most people can be trusted”, 
“Can’t be too careful”, or “Don’t know”. In a second moment, we asked interviewees to assign a 
score to the statement “people can be trusted”, the score ranging from 1 to 5, with the aim to build a 
social trust indicator to be used within the SEM analysis
1. 
It is noteworthy that trust measured through surveys is a “micro” and “cognitive” concept, in that it 
represents the individuals’ perception of their social environment, related to the particular position 
that interviewed people occupy in the social structure. The advisability to aggregate the individuals’ 
                                                 
1 The relative question is: to what extent do you agree with the statement “people can be trusted”, where possible 
responses are not at all, very little, so-so, quite a lot, very much.   7
responses to create a measure of “macro” or “social” trust has been questioned by some authors. 
Aggregated data may lose the linkage with the social and historical circumstances in which trust 
and social capital are located. As pointed out by Foley and Edwards (1999), empirical studies based 
on cross-country comparisons of trust may be a cul de sac, because of their inability to address 
macro outcomes, in view of the absence of the broader context within which attitudes are created 
and determined. Fine (2001) argues that “if social capital is context-dependent – and context is 
highly variable by how, when and whom, then any conclusion are themselves illegitimate as the 
basis for generalisation to other circumstances” (Fine 2001, 105). In this paper data have been used 
only at the micro level, without carrying out any form of aggregation.  
 
3.2 Trust towards the institutions 
The empirical analysis accounts for two types of trust towards public institutions: 
a.  trust towards political institutions, as measured through the question: “I am going to name a 
number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me whether do you feel confidence in 
them? Is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or 
none at all?”. The relative indicator is the arithmetic mean of the scores given by respondents to 
the following items: the national government, the parliament, politicians in general, and political 
parties. 
b.  Trust in public services. This is computed through the same question reported above as the 
arithmetic mean of the scores given by interviewees to the court system, bureaucrats of the 
public administration, the public health care system, and public transports
2. This variable has 
been accounted for with the purpose to test Kumlin and Rothstein’s (2005) claims on the role of 
the welfare state in the socialization of trust. According to the authors, citizens in developed 
welfare states frequently come into direct personal contact with many different types of public 
agencies and services. Social insurance, public healthcare, and public transports are but a few 
examples of this. In many cases, such institutions can be pervasive factors in people’s daily 
lives. So, “It is reasonable to suspect that people’s views of the society around them and of their 
fellow human beings are shaped to a great extent through their contacts with such public state 
institutions” (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005, 349). The authors’ empirical analysis, based on 
Swedish survey data, suggests that contacts with universal welfare-state
 institutions and efficient 
public services tend to increase social trust. In this paper, we address the possible relationship 
between the confidence and satisfaction in public services and the diffusion of social trust.  
 
                                                 
2 In the calculation of both the indicators of trust towards the institutions, scores have been conveniently recoded.   8
3.3 Knowledge-based trust 
Knowledge-based trust is given by the confidence in well-known people and in people holding a 
similar status. This variable is computed as the arithmetic mean of the scores assigned by 
respondents to the trustworthiness of the following people: family members, friends, and people in 
the neighbourhood. Knowledge-based trust can be considered as one of the transmission channels 
promoting the socialization of trust outside the boundaries of closed networks: the trustworthiness 
of people we meet regularly could be a crucial factor shaping our confidence in the whole social 
environment surrounding us. In this sense, bonding social capital, or the ties we form with people 
like ourselves, may indirectly influence social trust through the accumulation of knowledge-based 
trust. 
 
4 Social capital: definition and measurement 
One of the most popular definitions of social capital refers to the set of “features of social life – 
networks, norms, and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue 
shared objectives” (Putnam, 1995). In this paper, trust and social capital are separately taken, and 
the economic role of the latter is assessed just in relation to its ability to promote the “socialization” 
of trust. Of course, from a lexical point of view, it is possible to attribute the “social capital” label to 
every aspect of the economy’s social fabric providing a favourable environment for production and 
well-being. However, such kind of definition poses a “logic” problem: if social capital is everything 
can make agents cooperate or markets work better, then any empirical analysis will find that social 
capital causes cooperation among agents and improves the efficiency of markets. This approach 
“sterilizes” the empirical research on social capital, making it unable to foster the explanatory 
power of studies addressing the socio-cultural factors of growth
3.  
In our empirical analysis, social capital is identified with networks of relationships cemented by 
repeated interactions and shared values. However, both everyday-life experience and previous 
empirical studies suggest that social networks may play a double-sided role in economic 
development and well-being (Knack and Keefer, 1997, Coates and Heckelman, 2003, Sabatini, 
2008b). On the one side, they are a fertile ground for nurturing trust and shared values, which 
reduce monitoring costs and facilitate transactions. Repeated interactions among group members 
                                                 
3 This statement applies not only to studies defining social capital as trust. Most empirical studies measure social capital 
through “indirect” indicators, not representing the social capital’s key components already identified by the theoretical 
literature (commonly social networks, trust and social norms). Such indicators – e.g. crime rates, teenage pregnancy, 
blood donation, participation rates in tertiary education – are quite popular in the empirical research, but their use has 
led to considerable confusion about what social capital is, as distinct from its outcomes, and what the relationship 
between social capital and its outcomes may be. Research reliant upon an outcome of social capital as an indicator of it 
will necessarily find social capital to be related to that outcome. Social capital becomes tautologically present whenever 
an outcome is observed (Portes, 1998, Durlauf, 1999, Fine, 2001).   9
foster the diffusion of information raising reputations’ relevance. The higher opportunity cost of 
free-riding in prisoners’ dilemma kind of situations makes the agents’ behaviour more foreseeable 
causing an overall reduction of uncertainty. Therefore, an increase in trust-based relations may 
reduce the average cost of transactions, just as an increase in physical capital reduces the average 
cost of production. However, networks can work in the opposite direction as well: members of a 
group may use their ties as a means for the pursuit of narrow sectarian interests, and organizations 
may lobby against the interest of other groups. The distinction between bonding, bridging, linking, 
and corporate social capital reflects the different roles that networks may play in shaping the 
economic development of a society.  
 
4.1 Bonding social capital 
The term “bonding” holds a negative connotation and generally refers to small circles of 
homogeneous people that do not cooperate with other outside the boundaries of the group. The 
literature has often focused on the family as a potential form of bonding social capital. In his 
pioneer study, Banfield (1958) partly attributed the backwardness of Southern Italy to the inability 
of citizens “to act together for their common good or, indeed, for any end transcending the 
immediate, material interest of the nuclear family” (1958, 10). According to the author, any family 
activity was oriented towards the protection and consolidation of the isolated family unit. “Moral” 
activity (i.e. any action informed by moral norms of trust and reciprocity) was seen as limited to 
family insiders, with outsiders only being significant as a potential resource to exploit for the 
family. Applying Banfield’s claims to the purposes of this paper, we can argue that strong family 
ties may act as a factor hampering the diffusion of social or generalized trust. In our analysis, we 
have measured bonding social capital as the arithmetic mean of the frequency of the encounters  
with a range of familiars, as measured through the question “How many times in the past 12 months 
did you meet your familiars?”, where possible responses are “everyday”, “once or more a week”, 
“once or more a month”, “once or more a year”, “never”, and “I have not living familiars”, with 
reference to the interviewee’s parents, brothers, and children
4.  
 
4.2 Bridging social capital 
Bridging social capital is given by horizontal ties shaping heterogeneous groups of people with 
different backgrounds. The term bridging refers to the ability of such networks to create “bridges” 
                                                 
4 Responses have been conveniently recoded. We chose indicators of the intensity of relationships, instead of 
accounting for alternative measures, with the purpose to focus on a “structural”, not cognitive, and more reliable 
measure of family ties. Of course, the choice of indicators for the measurement of intangible phenomena is always 
questionable. For extensive reviews on social capital’s measurement problems, see for example Durlauf and Fafchamps 
(2006) and Sabatini (2007).   10
connecting sectors of society that, otherwise, would have never come into contact. The common 
claim is that such relationships have positive effects on the diffusion of information and trust, thus 
fostering transactions and economic growth. In this paper, bridging social capital is measured by the 
frequency of the encounters with friends, as captured through the question “How many times in the 
past 12 months did you meet your friends?”. The basic idea is that bridging social capital can be 
accumulated not only through individual investment decisions, but also as an accidental by-product 
of the simultaneous production and consumption of relational goods. It is worth noting that the 
relationship between (production and consumption of) relational goods and the accumulation of 
social capital has a double direction. On the one side, a higher social capital increases the returns to 
the time spent in social participation. For instance, it is easier and more rewarding going out with 
friends in a context that offers many options for socially enjoyed leisure. On the other side, a higher 
social participation brings about social capital accumulation as a by-product. According to Antoci, 
Sacco and Vanin (2007), trust and empathy may be reinforced and generalized through social 
interactions. 
 
4.3 Linking social capital 
The term linking social capital describes ties connecting individuals, or the groups they belong to, 
to people or groups in position of political or financial power. For example, civil society 
organizations allow citizens to come into contact with the institutions to carry out advocacy 
activities through collective action. This kind of networks is critical for leveraging resources, ideas 
and information beyond normal community linkages and, therefore, may play a significant role for 
social well-being. However, the role of organizations in development is widely debated in the 
literature. Economic studies suggest that much depends on the context where NGOs’ activities take 
place. Knack and Keefer (1997) sustain that cooperation and solidarity connected with the presence 
of voluntary associations work better at the level of smaller communities. In the authors’ words: “If 
the economic goals of a group conflict with those of other groups or of unorganized interests, the 
overall effect of group memberships and activities on economic performance could be negative … 
Although the ability of groups to articulate their interests is likely to be an important restraint on 
government, it also provides groups a way to capture private benefits at the expense of society” 
(1997, 1271).  
Networks related to civic engagement have been historically measured through the density of 
voluntary organizations. However, there are some reasons to doubt the efficacy of such indicator: 
besides a range of problems like self-selection and homogeneity among group members, it is worth 
pointing out that face-to-face interactions inside voluntary organizations could be modest and not   11
necessarily imply the sharing of information and values. This is particularly true in advanced 
economies, where participation in voluntary organizations is often limited to an annual subscription 
related to the payment of a membership fee. This kind of civic participation may have small 
spillovers effects, scarcely contributing to the diffusion of trust. In the light of these arguments, 
following a path traced in Sabatini (2008c), we measure civic participation through the density of 
voluntary organizations (i.e. the average number of organizations in which interviewees are 
involved, or the so-called “Putnam’s instrument”),  and the degree of members’ involvement in the 
associational life. The latter is captured through the frequency of meetings
5, the performance of 
unpaid work as a volunteer for an association
6, the making of payments for funding associational 
activities
7, and the willingness to give concrete help to strangers in need in the context of 
volunteering activities, considered as the most demanding way of participation
8. The synthetic 
indicator of linking social capital is computed as the weighted mean of the basic variables, where 
weights reflect the level of relational involvement. 
 
4.4 Corporate social capital 
As argued by Knack and Keefer (1997), organizations can behave pro-socially as well as anti-
socially. Volunteer organizations, ecological, human rights and peace associations are generally 
considered as a form of positive social capital fostering the socialization of trust. However, other 
kinds of formal networks may work in the opposite direction. Olson (1965) was the first to stress 
that professional associations, labour unions and political parties pursue the special interests of their 
members thereby generating social costs and reducing cohesion. In this paper, we label this kind of 
associations as “corporate social capital”, measured by the weighted mean of four variables 
capturing a) the density of professional organizations protecting entrepreneurs’ interests and b) the 
degree of members’ involvement in the associational life
9.  
                                                 
5 The frequency of meetings is measured through the question: “In the last year, have you taken an active part in 
gatherings of any of the following groups or associations: associations/groups involved in social, environmental, 
religious, cultural, sports or recreational, or voluntary activities? With which frequency?” 
6 The relative question is: “In the last year, have you performed unpaid work for any of the following groups of 
associations: associations/groups involved in social, environmental, religious, cultural, sports or recreational, or 
voluntary activities?” 
7 The relative question is: “In the last year, did you make payments to fund any of the following groups of associations: 
associations/groups involved in social, environmental, religious, cultural, sports or recreational, or voluntary activities?” 
8 The relative question is: “In the last year, did you give some form of concrete help to strangers in need, in the context 
of your associational activity?”, where the people in need cannot be relatives, friends, colleagues and other known 
people.   
9 The relative items in the questionnaire are as follows: “Are you a member of a professional association?”, “How 
many?”, “In the last year, have you taken an active part in gatherings of a professional association? With which 
frequency?”, “In the last year, did you make payments to fund the activity of a professional association?” 
   12
 
5. Methodological issues 
The questionnaire has been submitted in spring 2007 to a group of 82 people through customized 
interviews. Participants have been selected following qualitative criteria, and do not constitute a 
representative sample of the entire population. Interviewees are stakeholders belonging to a network 
of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) of the Italian industrial district of the Tuscia, located about 
60 miles north of Rome. This case study is of general interest for various reasons. First, industrial 
districts (IDs) are a central feature of the Italian model of development, largely based on the driving 
force of SMEs. The extent to which such stakeholders feel confident about the social and economic 
environment is a crucial factor of local development (or underdevelopment). Second, networks of 
entrepreneurs running small business are unanimously considered as the glue holding together 
industrial districts. Finally, the IDs-based model of development is currently facing a major 
challenge, since globalization’s processes are posing a threat just to those socio-economic ties 
which shape entrepreneurial networks. The group is composed by entrepreneurs and other 
professionals involved in the network’s activities. More in particular, 49% of the group are   
entrepreneurs (sole proprietors, owners or members of family businesses, or active shareholders), 
27% are self-employed professionals strictly cooperating with entrepreneurs, and 24% are managers 
or headmasters of the enterprises under consideration. The empirical analysis is structured in two 
stages. The possible effect of networks on generalized trust is preliminarily assessed through a 
simple probit model in section 6. Hints from the analysis are then used as the basis of a more in-
depth investigation into the relationships between social capital’s and trust’s various dimensions 
carried out by means of structural equations models (SEMs) in section 7. Results from the empirical 
analyses carried out in sections 6 and 7 are discussed in the concluding remarks of the article 
(section 8). 
 
6. Probit analysis 
In this section, we carry out a first exploration of the possible determinants of social trust by means 
of a probit analysis. The dependent variable Y is the probability to trust strangers (as captured 
through the “Rosenberg question” described in section 3), which is equal to 1 if the interviewee 
thinks that “most people can be trusted”, and 0 if he thinks that “you can’t be too careful” in dealing 
with people. Thus a negative coefficient implies that including this independent variable reduces the 
probability to trust others. The independent variables are bonding social capital x1, measured by the 
indicator described in section 4.1, bridging social capital x2 (section 4.2), linking social capital x3 
(section 4.3), corporate social capital x4 (section 4.4), knowledge-based trust x5 (section 3.3), trust in   13
public services x6 (section 3.2, point b), trust towards political institutions x7 (section 3.2, point a). 
To these dimensions of social capital and trust, we added a further explanatory variable x8 given by 
“subjective safety”. The concept of “safety” can have many different meanings. The
 Concise Oxford 
Dictionary defines it as “freedom from danger
 and risks”. Here we define safety as the subjective 
perception that the local community is a safe place, where, for example, there is no fear of walking 
alone after dusk. The indicator is computed as the arithmetic mean of the scores assigned by 
respondents to a series of statements on the local community
10. The probit model is as follows: 
 
() () 8 8 7 7 6 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 1 x x x x x x x x x X Y P β β β β β β β β β + + + + + + + + Φ = = =  (1) 
 
Parameters estimates are presented in table 1: 
 
Table 1. Parameters estimates and goodness of fit chi-square for model  (1) 
Variable  Regression coefficient  Coeff. / St. error 
Bonding social capital  -0,0939570      -0,8773     
Bridging social capital  0,0544135      0,2190      
Linking social capital  0,485418       2,320       
Corporate social capital  0,0977526      0,5066      
Knowledge-based trust  0,252731  0,4899      
Trust in political institutions  0,199306       0,3252      
Trust in public services  0,601348       0,8478      
Safety  2,95614        2,662       
Intercept  -3,37272        -2,637                
Goodness-of-fit chi square = 27,7927; DF = 8; p-value = 0,000515 
Log-likelihood = -36,8378 
 
 
Subjective safety and linking social capital are the only variables exhibiting a positive and 
significant relationship with social trust, while the coefficients related to all the other explanatory 
variables are not significant. The model predicts respondents’ attitude to trust others with a 
satisfactory accuracy of 79.7 percent. The p-value indicates the probability of obtaining the 
                                                 
10 Statements are: “I feel safe walking down my street after dark”, “In my local community I feel at home”, “My local 
community is renowned as a safe place”, “If I drop my purse or wallet in the neighbourhood, someone will see it and 
return it to me”.   14
goodness-of-fit chi-square statistic (27.79) if there is no effect of the independent variables, taken 
together, on the dependent variable. In this case, the model is statistically significant because the 
chi-square statistic is higher than the critical value with 8 degrees of freedom (27.79 > 13.36), and 
the p-value is less than 0.000, so the null hypothesis is rejected.  
 
6.1 Model refinements and robustness checks 
The low significance of β2, β4, β5, and β6 suggests to test the hypothesis that x2, x4, x5, and x6, taken 
together, do not affect trust in people. The null hypothesis is  0 : 6 5 4 2 0 = = = = β β β β H  and the 
new model is: 
 
() () 8 8 7 7 3 3 1 1 0 1 x x x x x X Y P β β β β β + + + + Φ = = =  (2) 
 
The likelihood chi-square test statistic is calculated as  ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 ˆ 2 β β l l − , where  () 0 β l  is the log-
likelihood under the null hypothesis (-37,2944) and  ( ) β ˆ l  is the log-likelihood of model (1). Its value 
is equal to 0,913264, which is lower than the critical value of the chi-square with four degrees of 
freedom at 0.100 level of significance (7.78), so the null hypothesis is not rejected and bridging and 
corporate social capital (x2 and x4), knowledge-based trust x5 and trust towards political institutions 
x6 can be excluded from the model. Model (2) is statistically significant because the chi-square 
statistic is higher than the critical value for 4 degrees of freedom (27,27 > 7.78), and the p-value is 
less than 0.000, so the null hypothesis that all parameters are equal to zero is rejected. The probit 
equation predicts respondents’ attitude to trust others with a satisfactory accuracy of 75,0 percent.  
Parameters estimates for model (2) are reported in table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. Parameters estimates and goodness of fit chi-square for model  (2) 
Variable  Regression coefficient  Coeff. / St. error 
Bonding social capital  -0,0863525      -0,8470     
Linking social capital  0,525065       2,665       
Trust in public services  0,475110       0,7862      
Safety  3,07526        2,867       
Intercept  -3,02953        -3,384                
Goodness-of-fit chi square = 27,2713; DF = 4; p-value = 0,000018 
Log-likelihood = -37,5134   15
 
The model’s results suggest that people feeling that the surrounding environment is safe exhibit a 
higher probability to be high-trusters. Subjective safety is the variable exerting the highest positive 
and significant influence on generalized trust. Linking social capital also positively and 
significantly correlates with trust, but to a weaker extent. The model is robust to the addition of a 
series of control variables, like the educational qualification of respondents, their age, work status 
and firm size. 
 
7. SEM analysis 
Goldberger defines a SEM as “A stochastic model where each equation represents a causal linkage, 
rather than a simple empirical association” (Goldberger, 1972, 979). SEMs are composed by 
regression equations, which are included in the model only so far as it is possible to interpret them 
as causal relationships, theoretically justifiable and not falsified by data (Garson, 2008). While 
designing the structural model, the researcher puts forward some hypotheses on the linkages 
connecting the phenomena under consideration. The consistency of such hypotheses with the 
pattern of variances and covariances in the data is then assessed through the goodness-of-fit tests. In 
practice, this approach combines exploratory and confirmatory purposes: first, a model is theorized 
and tested using SEM procedures. If it is found to be deficient, an alternative model is then tested 
based on changes suggested by SEM modification indexes. However, it must be stated that, as other 
unexamined models may fit the data as well or better, an accepted model should be considered only 
as a not-disconfirmed model. Thus, even if the use of SEMs certainly allows us to make a further 
step towards a better understanding of the multifaceted effects of social capital, the problem of 
causality still remains open to question, and causal ambiguities are not solved. A peculiarity of 
SEMs is the possibility to account for other parameters in addition to structural  β linking 
endogenous and exogenous variables. More precisely, it is possible to account for variances and 
covariances among errors ε, which play a decisive role in defining the model presented in this 
paper. The matrix Ψ of covariances among errors ζ has been carefully defined in each of the models 
that have been tested within the analysis, with the aim to account for variables which, although not 
explicitly considered within the model, may play a role in the real scenario described by observed 
data. 
Let η1 be linking social capital, η2 knowledge-based trust, η3 trust in public services, η4 generalized 
or social trust, η5 subjective safety, ξ1 bonding social capital, ξ2 corporate social capital, ξ3 bridging 
social capital. ζi, with i = (1,…, 5) are the errors related to endogenous variables. In the model with   16
the best goodness of fit, linking social capital is influenced by social trust, subjective safety, and 
other unknown factors affecting also confidence in public services and generalized trust: 
 
1 5 51 4 41 1 ζ η β η β η + + =  (3) 
 
Knowledge-based trust is mostly affected by bonding and bridging social capital: 
 
3 3 23 1 21 2 ζ ξ γ ξ γ η + + =  (4) 
 
Trust in public services is affected by linking and bridging social capital and by other variables 
influencing also linking social capital: 
 
3 3 33 1 31 3 ζ ξ γ η β η + + =  (5) 
 
Social trust is affected by linking, bridging, and corporate social capital, confidence in public 
services, subjective safety, and other unknown factors influencing also civic engagement: 
 
4 3 43 2 42 5 45 3 43 1 41 4 ζ ξ γ ξ γ η β η β η β η + + + + + =  (6) 
 
Subjective safety is influenced by linking social capital: 
 
5 1 51 5 ζ η β η + =  (7) 
 
Errors  3 ζ  and  1 ζ , and  4 ζ  and  1 ζ  are correlated. This implies the need to estimate, besides 
parameters  β , also covariances ϕ  between errors. In the model, other assumptions are carried out 
to the seek of simplicity: independent variables and errors are not correlated in the same 
equation: () 0 ' = ξζ E ; structural equations are not redundant; this condition means that η -equations 
are independent between them, and each endogenous variable η  can not be a linear combination of 
the others; finally, we have supposed that all variables have been measured without errors, therefore 
there is a perfect identity between latent and observed variables. This allows us to omit 
measurement models for endogenous and exogenous variables and to focus exclusively on the 
structural equations model and on the explanation of the causal relationships linking variables. 
Combining equations from (3) to (7) with the error covariance matrix, we can write the model as:   17
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ψ   (8) 
 
It is noteworthy that the absence of a variable from the model can arise in two ways: a) a 
relationship was originally assumed to be insignificant for conceptual reasons; b) or a relationship 
was hypothesized to be potentially significant but was empirically found not to be. For example, 
variables  1 ξ  and  2 ξ  (bonding and bridging social capital) were allowed to enter in equation (7) 
describing subjective safety. They do not appear in the model because they were statistically 
insignificant when allowed to enter, not because they were excluded in the first place. 
Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of the model. The graphic representation of SEMs 
follows the path analysis symbology. It reports the variables, their errors and the linkages 
connecting variables. Such connections are represented both graphically, by arrows, and 
numerically, by regression coefficients. Latent variables are inscribed in an ellipse, while observed 
variables in a rectangle. In model (8) all variables are inscribed in ellipses, due to the hypothesis 
that variables have been measured without errors. The causal nexus between two variables is 
represented by a straight arrow moving from the independent variable to the dependent variable. 
The association (covariation) between two variables is represented by a bidirectional curved arrow 
connecting them. The absence of arrows means the hypothesis of the absence of linkages between 
































The model excellently fits the data and all the goodness of fit indexes exhibit satisfactory values 
(goodness of fit measures are briefly described in Annex A). Parameters estimates are presented in 
Table 3, where blank cells represent coefficients constrained to be zero.  
The results suggest that social trust is positively and significantly affected by subjective safety and, 
to a quite lesser extent, by confidence in public services and corporate social capital. According to 
the SEM analysis, there is a negative significant association between trust in people and civic 
engagement through voluntary organizations. Associational participation seems to be negatively 
influenced by subjective safety, but is significantly reinforced by social trust. Such correlation 
suggests the possibility that high-trusters are more inclined to civic engagement and tend to self-
select into voluntary organizations. Corporate ties positively and significantly affect trust towards 
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Figure 1. Path diagram of model (8)   19
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These results are robust to different model specifications. First, in the process of refining the 
theoretical model and testing its consistency with the data, we have estimated some refinements 
resulting from the inclusion of additional parameters, accounting for the possible existence of 
further linkages connecting the variables under consideration. Second, we tested the model again 
after the inclusion of the same control variables adopted within the probit analysis in section 6, i.e. 
educational qualification, age, work status and firm size. In any of these cases, the sign, the size, 
and the significance of the parameters’ estimates presented in Table 3 changed significantly, nor the 
overall goodness of fit of the model worsened.  
The findings from the SEM analysis partly contradict the results of the probit analysis performed in 
section 6, which suggested the possibility of a positive influence of linking social capital on social 
trust. In order to test the self-selection hypothesis advanced in this section, we run a new probit 
analysis where linking social capital – as measured by a very simple indicator capturing 
membership in associations – is the dependent variable, and generalized trust is moved to the 
second member. Differently from section 6, generalized trust is now measured by the score assigned 
to the statement “most people can be trusted” (see section 3.1). Membership is a binary variable, 
which is equal to one when the respondent is member of at least one association, and 0 if the 
interviewee does not belong to any organization. The probit equation is as follows: 
   20
() () 8 8 7 7 6 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 1 x x x x x x x x x X Y P β β β β β β β β β + + + + + + + + Φ = = =  (9) 
 
with xi (i = 1,…, 8) having the same meaning as in section 6 with the only exception of x3, now 
representing generalized trust. Parameters’ estimates are presented in Table 4: 
 
 
Table 4. Parameters estimates and goodness of fit chi-square for model  (9) 
Variable  Regression coefficient  Coeff. / St. error 
Bonding social capital  -0,00285917  -0,02569 
Bridging social capital  0,730843  2,547 
Social trust  0,822198  2,426 
Corporate social capital 0,493714  2,319 
Knowledge-based trust  -0,825483  -1,402 
Trust in political institutions  0,175118  0,2664 
Trust in public services  1,11666  1,368 
Safety -1,30771  -0,5570 
Intercept -4,57651  -2,973 
Goodness-of-fit chi square = 31,9419; DF = 8; p-value = 0,000095 




Results from the SEM analysis are confirmed: social trust positively and significantly affects 
linking social capital, thereby supporting the self-selection hypothesis. An interesting additional 
finding is given by the positive and significant influence of bridging and corporate social capital on 
social participation
11. Due to the insignificance of  8 7 6 5 1 , , , , β β β β β , we have tested the null 
hypothesis 0 : 8 7 6 5 1 0 = = = = = β β β β β H . The new equation is: 
 
() ( ) 4 4 3 3 2 2 0 1 x x x x X Y P β β β β + + + Φ = = =  (10) 
 
                                                 
11  The model predicts membership in associations with a satisfactory accuracy of 75.9 percent. The model is 
statistically significant because the chi-square statistic is higher than the critical value with 8 degrees of freedom (31.94 
> 13.36), and the p-value is less than 0.000, so the null hypothesis that all parameters are equal to zero is rejected.    21
As it is reported in Table 5, results are confirmed
12. 
 
Table 5. Parameters estimates and goodness of fit chi-square for model  (10) 
Variable  Regression coefficient  Coeff. / St. error 
Social trust  0,583801  3,930 
Bridging social capital  0,506589  2,142 
Corporate social capital 0,371674  2,057 
Intercept -4,10780  -4,066 
Goodness-of-fit chi square = 28,5839; DF = 3; p-value = 0,000003 




8. Discussion of results and concluding remarks 
The essay has carried out an empirical investigation into the determinants of trust in other people 
within a community of entrepreneurs running small and medium businesses in the context of an 
industrial district. The results suggest that the main factors fostering social trust are a sense of safety 
(i.e. the perception that the local community is a safe place), confidence in public services, and, to a 
quite lesser extent, corporate ties created through membership in professional associations. 
Confidence in public services is knowledge-based, in the sense that it probably reflects respondent’s 
experience about their efficiency. Our empirical analysis suggests that extensive and efficient 
services may reinforce trust in other people. The transmission mechanism has been already 
analyzed by Kumlin and Rothstein (2005), who find that contacts with universal welfare-state
 
institutions and efficient public services tend to increase social trust in Sweden. According to the 
authors, citizens in developed welfare states frequently come into direct personal contact with many 
different types of public agencies and services. The court system, public healthcare, and public 
transports are but a few examples of this. In many cases, such institutions can be pervasive factors 
in people’s daily lives. So, “It is reasonable to suspect that people’s views of the society around 
them and of their fellow human beings are shaped to a great extent through their contacts with such 
                                                 
12 The likelihood chi-square test statistic’s value is 4,71957, which is lower than the critical value of the chi-square with 
5 degrees of freedom at 0.100 level of significance (9.24), so the null hypothesis is not rejected and bonding social 
capital, knoledge-based trust, confidence in public services, and trust towards political institutions can be excluded from 
the model. Model (10) is statistically significant because the chi-square statistic is higher than the critical value for 3 
degrees of freedom (28,5839 > 6.25), and the p-value is less than 0.000, so the null hypothesis that all parameters are 
equal to zero is rejected. The probit equation predicts membership in associations with a satisfactory accuracy of 74.4 
percent.  
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public state institutions” (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005, 349). This argument is based upon the 
concept of procedural justice (Rawls, 1971), which has been used in the psychological research to 
show that people are concerned not only with the final results of personal contacts with public 
institutions, but also in whether the process that eventually led to the final result can be seen as fair 
(Thibaut and Walker, 1975; Lind and Tyler, 1988). Kumlin and Rothstein suggest that there are 
numerous aspects of procedural justice involved in citizens’ relations with public services provided 
by the state. “These may involve questions of whether the individual was received with respect and 
dignity, whether he or she was able to communicate opinions to the civil servants, if there are signs 
of discrimination or corruption” (2005, 350). 
The positive association between corporate social capital and both knowledge-based and social trust 
was expected and sounds quite evident. In a small community, entrepreneurs can use membership in 
a professional association as an effective mean to establish linking ties with agents belonging to 
other socio-economic categories, like people in the institutions or strangers operating in other 
sectors of the economy. The strength of such ties reduces social distances, thereby fostering the 
perception that both strangers and people in the institutions may be treated as if they were known 
and trustworthy through at least three channels:  
- even if there is not a history of past interaction with people in the institutions, the condition of 
belonging to an association raises the likelihood to interact with them again in the future. 
- Associations are a powerful means for acquiring information on strangers. Moreover, the higher 
likelihood to repeat interactions raises the possibility of retaliation in case of free-riding. 
- When they belong to a group, entrepreneurs do not feel defenceless against opportunist 
behaviours. So they are less anxious and do not need to be on the defensive every time they interact 
with strangers. This could lead to a more open-minded and trusting attitude towards “the others”.  
Adopting Uslaner’s (2002) terminology, we could state that the linking role played by certain 
networks enables the extension of the knowledge-based trust to unknown people, fostering the 
accumulation of social trust. This is not properly moralistic trust in the sense suggested by Uslaner, 
but an extension to strangers of the knowledge-based trust described by Yamagishi (1998). In other 
words, associations may act as a catalyst for the transformation of particularized trust into 
generalized trust, which in turn fosters the economic activity. Such a mechanism is a relevant policy 
tool in social environments which are not characterized by a deep tradition of participation and 
shared values.  
On the contrary, civic engagement through voluntary organizations is found to be negatively and 
significantly associated with the social trust of entrepreneurs. These results are only apparently 
conflicting with Putnam’s (1993) claims on the positive role of civil society and Olson’s (1965)   23
arguments “against” professional associations reported in section 4.4. Professional associations 
have for entrepreneurs the same “linking” role which Putnam (1993) attributes to civil society 
organizations in reference to the entire population. Even if such ties may be used to pursue special 
interests generating social costs and worsening social cohesion, they certainly reinforce 
entrepreneurs’ self-confidence and trust in others. 
Engagement in associations seems to be significantly reinforced by social trust. Such correlation 
suggests that, even though individuals who join groups and who interact with others regularly show 
attitudinal and behavioural differences compared to nonjoiners, the possibility exists that people 
self-select into association groups, depending on their original levels of generalized trust and 
reciprocity. This result has some precedent in the literature: using survey data on Norway, 
Wollebaek and Selle (2003) show that participating in voluntary organizations does not increase 
trust in other people. Rather, the correlation between high levels of membership in organizations 
and higher trust seems to be created by “reversed causation”. Grounding on survey data collected in 
Germany and Sweden, Stolle (1998) finds evidence of the existence of a selection bias: people who 
join associations are significantly more trusting than people who do not join.  
This phenomenon can be explained through the influence that attitude similarity exerts on 
attraction. Perceived similarity of others in attitudes and opinions about social issues is a key factor 
in determining our choice to approach them (Byrne, Ervin and Lamberth, 1970, Byrne, 1971, Duck, 
1975). Moreover, people with high generalized trust tend to be quicker in the perception of value 
similarity of others than those with low generalized trust (Siegrist, Earle and Gutscher, 2003). Thus, 
they are more likely to join social networks and to engage together in collective actions.  
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Annex A. Goodness of fit measures 
Measures of the model’s goodness of fit are a function of the residual, i.e. the difference between 
the empirical variance-covariance matrix and the model-created variance-covariance matrix. It is 
possible to show (Bonnet and Bentler, 1983), that, if the model is correct, the fitting statistic follows 
a  2 χ  with df degrees of freedom, where  () ( ) t q p q p df − + + + = 1
2
1
,  p is the number of 
endogenous variables, q is the number of exogenous variables, and t is the number of estimated   27
parameters. In order to evaluate the goodness of fit, the residual function for the model must be 
compared with critical values  reported in  2 χ  distribution tables with a probability P = 0.100. Since 
the value for model (8) is significantly lower than the critical value for a  2 χ  with 16 degrees of 
freedom, we can state that the difference between the two variance-covariance matrixes is stochastic 
in nature, and is not due to the inappropriateness of the theoretical model. All the other goodness of 
fit indexes exhibit satisfactory values.  






1− =  
 
is equal to 0.98. This means a good fit.  
The Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) takes into account also the model’s number of degrees 
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where df are degrees of freedom, and k is the number of variances-covariances in input; k is given 
by: 
 
() ( ) 1
2
1
+ + + = q p q p k  
 
The AGFI is equal to 0.96, thus indicating a good fit.  





RMR σ − Σ =  
 
is equal to 0 when the theoretical model-generated variance-covariance matrix fits the empirical 
matrix, and infinitely grows when the model’s goodness of fit worsens. The RMR of model (8) is 
equal to 0.041, thus indicating a good fit. 